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Commentary on Professor Spencer Weber Waller,
Bringing Globalism Home: Lessons from Antitrust
and Beyond
W. David Braun*
I am honored to have the opportunity to participate in this
gathering to give my brief comments on Professor Waller's article
and speech. It is a particular honor because I have known
Professor Waller for almost two decades. I am convinced that he
will bring the highest level of intellectual honesty, insight, and
analysis, based upon his rich professional and academic
experience, to this fine educational institution.
Professor Waller points out that America needs to begin to study
and analyze the developments of more than eighty foreign systems
of competition or antitrust law for lessons that America can learn
to reform our system of antitrust law.' The United States no longer
has a monopoly on antitrust wisdom. The European Union's
competition rules entered into force in 1958, and for at least the
past twenty years have been a mature system of antitrust law. That
maturity has accelerated over the past ten years as the European
enforcement agency, the Directorate-General for Competition,
based in Brussels, Belgium, has more vigorously enforced the
European competition rules against both state and private
enterprises with increasing commitment and enforcement impact in
the form of very substantial fines. In one recent case against
Volkswagen, the fines imposed amounted to over $100 million. 2
We can learn much from the European experience in two critical
areas: their treatment of state influenced commerce and their
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in the Chicago Field Office and in the Foreign Commerce Section of the Antitrust
Division, U.S. Department of Justice. He is also a co-author of RITTER, BRAUN,
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1. See Spencer Weber Waller, Bringing Globalization Home: Lessons from Antitrust
and Beyond, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 113 (2000).
2. See Commission Decision 98/273, art. 85, 1998 O.J. (L 124) 60, 94 (imposing a
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resolution of antitrust disputes. In handling state owned or
influenced enterprises, for instance, Europe applies its competition
law more aggressively to publicly owned or governmentally
influenced enterprises than we do in the United States. This
should be no surprise as many European economies are subject to
much heavier governmental regulation and influence than the
American economy. Many of the major European enterprises -
airlines, automobile producers, banks and others - were partly or
wholly state owned or controlled. This direct or indirect blurring
of private and public enterprises and governmental influence over
the commercial conduct of such enterprises made it necessary for
Europe to develop an entire body of European competition law that
applies to state monopolies, state owned businesses and state
influenced firms. By contrast, the United States' "state action"
doctrine is a modestly developed and relatively non-aggressive
doctrine that protects against the application of our antitrust laws
to governmental decision making that may suppress competition
and impair consumer welfare.
The two standards for antitrust immunity under America's so-
called "state action" doctrine are merely that: (1) the challenged
restraint must be one that clearly articulates and affirmatively
expresses the state policy, and (2) the policy must be actively
supervised by the state itself.3 The Europeans, on the other hand,
have gone several steps further. Not wanting to leave to Member
States the ultimate discretion as to what measures may be
undertaken that distort or reduce competition, they have included
several special provisions in the European Union Treaty. Article
86(2), formerly -Article 90(2), of the European Union Treaty
exempts firms "entrusted with the operation of services of a
general economic interest" and "revenue-producing monopol[ies]"
from the competition rules only to the extent that: (1) "the
application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law
or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them," and (2) the
"development of trade [is] not ... affected to such an extent as
would be contrary to the interests of the Community." 4 These two
strict qualifications to the European "state action" exemption are
interesting. This provision covers public service industries, public
3. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n-v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97,
105 (1980).
4. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 1
(1997), 37 I.L.M. 56.
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utilities and, to a certain extent, the transport sector. In addition,
Article 86(1), formerly Article 90(1), prohibits Member States
from introducing or maintaining in force any measure in relation to
government owned or controlled enterprises or to private
enterprises granted special or exclusive rights that is contrary to
the rules of the European Union Treaty, in particular the rules on
competition and on non-discrimination. 5  Finally, the Court of
Justice has recognized that compensation must be paid if a Member
State breaches these rules. 6
No doubt there are logical reasons why the United States' "state
action" doctrine does not contemplate such a European-style, wide-
ranging inquiry by the United States' courts into the
appropriateness of state conduct that restrains competition. One
reason may be that the vast majority of the competitive conduct by
firms in our economy is relatively unfettered by -federal, state or
local government rules and regulations. Therefore, it is not
necessary to make an extensive, almost policy-oriented inquiry.
However, I suspect no less a reason is the fact that our antitrust
litigation system, to put it bluntly in the words that a European
would be likely to use, is an abomination.
Quite apart from the "state action" doctrine, the United States'
antitrust litigation system is, at best, a unique, expensive, and
unduly burdensome one when compared to the European system.
Several of the key differences between the European and American
antitrust litigation systems should cause us to reassess our
approach to antitrust litigation. Consider the following:
1. Treble Damages. The United States is the only major
antitrust system in the world that imposes treble damages for
violation of its competition rules. Particularly in those cases that
do not involve per se violations where we apply the "Rule of
Reason," there is, in my humble opinion, little value and even less
logic to imposing such a multiple damages penalty that is not
proportionate to the injury suffered. 7 The concept of de-trebling
damages in United States antitrust litigation in respect to "Rule of
5. See id. art. 86(1).
6. See Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I-
5357, [1993] 2 C.M.L.R. 66 (1993).
7. The "Rule of Reason" requires an evaluation of the purposes and effects of the
arrangement, whereas the per se rule does not permit such an inquiry. See Broadcast
Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979) (discussing application of the per se rule);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (noting that "the
legality of an agreement ... cannot be determined by so simple a test").
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Reason" claims has been advocated by responsible commentators
for some time and should be adopted.
2. Wide-Ranging Discovery. No other legal system in the
world permits unbridled discovery based upon mere good faith
allegations in a complaint. Many foreign systems permit only
limited discovery under the discretion of the judge. This is typical
of continental European legal systems. Any sensible litigation
system requires adequate judicial supervision over the litigation
process. Some courts in the United States are very effective in this
regard. An example is the "Rocket Docket" in the Federal District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which strictly limits the
scope and duration of discovery. Many civil courts in our country,
however, take a much too relaxed approach, thereby allowing
discovery to become a fishing expedition. Discovery should be a
means of discovering relevant facts, not a means of delay,
imposing undue costs or unfair burdens on another party.
3. Juries. Unlike the United States, no other major legal
system in the world permits juries to decide competition law cases.
Instead, many systems employ an administrative mechanism
combined with the right to appeal to a court of law. Moreover,
some countries employ specialized courts or courts of limited
jurisdiction, such as commercial courts, that have far greater
familiarity with the competition rules. While I am hardly sure a
system of specialized courts would work in the United States, I am
quite certain that the process would be far more efficient,
predictable and fair if a single judge or a panel of judges, rather
than a jury, would hear civil antitrust cases.
4. Attorneys' Fees. In many foreign jurisdictions, the losing
party must pay the costs and attorneys' fees of the winning party.
This is one of the strongest deterrents to bringing frivolous
lawsuits. Resort to the courts to resolve an antitrust dispute should
not be discouraged, but there should be consequences to the party
that loses, even if it is the plaintiff.
5. Criminalization. No other major jurisdiction in the world
pursues hard-core antitrust violations as a criminal offense with the
vigor or frequency of the Unites States Department of Justice. The
European Community imposes very severe administrative fines
that may rise to 10% of a company's total sales, but the individuals
concerned do not go to jail. Fines imposed rarely have risen to
even 5% of total sales in practice, but the fine amounting to
roughly $100 million against Volkswagen indicates that the impact
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can be a significant burden to violators. The criminalization of per
se United States antitrust violations is a real bone of contention
with our trading partners around the world, who view antitrust law
as an economic regulatory system that calls only for high
administrative fines or injunctive relief, but not criminalization.
As long as this difference exists, lively international debate will
continue. Here, I think the United States has the better argument.
Jurisdictions that are serious about deterring hard-core antitrust
violations, such as price fixing, market allocation, bid rigging and
the like, will be most effective when the individual perpetrators of
these serious violations must face severe personal consequences,
namely the threat of imprisonment and the stigma that is attached
to being charged with a criminal law violation. A heavy fine
against the company alone can never equal the deterrence value of
criminalization.
Where does this lead us? Hopefully, it will lead America to a
productive dialogue with our major trading partners regarding
modernizing and reforming certain aspects of the American
antitrust tradition. While I am skeptical that such a dialogue and
reform of our system would bring us toward a real convergence of
our systems, I submit that convergence is not the real point.
Advancing the American antitrust system by achieving a fairer,
more effective and predictable legal system for deterring anti-
competitive conduct - whether or not it crosses international
boundaries - is itself a valuable objective. The world does not
need uniformity in antitrust legal systems. Each system has its
own legal tradition, economic fundamentals, and overall regulatory
environment shaped by its own democratic process. After all,
maintaining some competitive rivalry between various national and
multinational systems of antitrust law is as desirable as preserving
the competitive markets that these laws are designed to protect.
2000]
